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ARE MANAGERS INDEED MOTIVATED BY THEIR BONUSES?
Harry G. Barkema
1. Introduction
During the last decade, principal-agent theory has become a major development in economics.l It
now constitutes the core of much modern theory in accounting, but also in organization theory and
financc.
Unfortunately, until today, there is no unambiguous empirical support for one of the main behavioral
assumptions of [his theory: that agents are (indeed) motiva[ed by their bonuses. A number of empirical
studies has measured a positive relation between the size of the managerial bonus and various measures
of firm performance (Larcker, 1983, Coughlan and Schmid[, 1985, Bensron, 1985, Tehranian and
Waegelein, 1985, Brickley, Bhagat and Lease, 1985, Murphy, 1985, 1986). In itself this evidence is
consistent with the agency 'story' that bonuscs motivatc managcrs to improve firm performance. Howcver
it is well known that this evidence is ambiguous, since it can also be explained by o[her hypotheses (see
Miller and Scholes, 1982, Hite and Long, 1982, Warner, 1985, Raviv, 1985, and Bhagat, Brickley and
Lease, 1985).
First, the evidence can also be ezplained by a tax story. Miller and Scholes (1982) argue that 'bonus
schemes' allow the firm to defer salary payments and to invest this salary on behalf of [he manager
during the deferral. This s[rategy allows tax benefits, because during [he deferral corpora[e taxes are paid
over the proceeds of the investmen[ instead of the (usually higher) personal [axes that the manager has
to pay if he invests his salary himself. So the Miller and Scholes tax story can explain the existence of
bonus schemes, and hence [he documented positive relation between bonuses and firm performance.i
Secondly, the evidence can be explained by a signalling story. A signalling story assumes that
managers may possess inside information or 'good ncws' that thcy wish to signal to [he marke[. One way
to cunvince the market of the truth of the signal is to adupt inccntive schemes lha[ reward management
in case thc good news is Iruc. To give an example: managcrs may accept a schcme [hat awards bonuses
to lhcm dcpendcnl on fulure firm performance, Ihus signalling tu thc markct lhal thcy expecl a favorable
ou[cume of investment projccts (Ross, 1977, Leland and Pyle, 1977). So a signalling story can also explain
that bonuses are rela[ed to firm performance.z
Thirdly, principal-agen[ theury assumes that the agent's pay is sensitive to his effort or, more preci-
sely, that [he compensation of agents is con[ingent on performance measures that are a stochastic
function of their effort. To give an example: compensation contracts may award bonuses to managers
conditional un the firm's profi[ or o[her firm performance measures. This contract structure alone could
account for the measured positive correlation betwcen bonuses and firm performance. This correlation
docs not necessarily mean [hat managers are motivated by thcir bonuses.
So at present there is no sound evidence in the compcnsation literature that supports that managers
are indced mo[ivated by their bonuses.3 In fact Jensen and Murphy find, from a data set of 2,213 US
CEOs, such a weak pay-performance sensi[ivy that they believe that these managers are at most weakly
motiva[ed by Iheir pay (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). This result is not wi[hou[ interesL [f in practice
managers are not - or a[ most weakly - motivated hy their pay then the relevance of much of principal-
agent seems limited.
The present paper provides a new mcthodology lo tcst whether managers arc motivated by lheir
honuscs. Contrary to previous studies, that examinc Ihc rclation bctwecn bcmuscs and various mcasures
of firm performance, this study directly measures the effect of [he manager's bonus on his individual
efCort. This effect is measured in such a way that uthcr ahove mentioned effccts: tax and signalling effects
and thc sensilivity of [he manager's bonus for his cffort. are explicilly statistically controlled.
Thc methudolugy in this paper is based on rccent principal-agen[ theory in Holmstrom and Milgrom
(19;t7, l~)9(1). In thc Holmstrom and Milgrom framcwurk, a raliunal manager allucates his limited auen-4
tion over various activities (work, Camily, recreation, etc.), dependen[ on the relative private costs and
gains associa[ed with these activities. As in other principal-agent theory, bonuses serve the purpose of
rewarding productive work, and are expected to increase the a[ten[ion that [he manager devotes to work.
Holmstrom and Milgrom define the attention that the manager devotes to work in terms of the time that
he devotes to work. Hence bonuses are expected to increase the amount of (his Wni[ed) time that the
manager devotes to work4
Based on this [heory, a non-recursive econome[ric model is specified that contains both the effect of
'bonus' on 'working time' and the reverse effect of 'working time' on 'bonus'. It is shown in the paper
that the former effect captures the hypothesized agency effect that the manager is positively motivated by
his bonus, and that the second effcct caplures both 1) the sensitivity of the manager's bonus for his
effort; and 2) tax and signalling effects. So this model allows a test of whether managers are motivated by
their bonuses, in such a way that [ax and signalling effects and [he sensi[ivity of Ihe manager's bonus for
his efCort are explicitly statistically controlled.
The model is estimated on a 1984 data set of 131 functional managers (financial managers, marketing
managers, etc.) of the computer and electronics-industry in the Netherlands5 All these managers are
ranked directly below general managemenL The reason for analyzing a data set of managers that are
homogenous in rank and industry is to mitigate omitted variables-problems 6 This still leaves poten[ial
omitted-variables associated with firm size, because even within one industry firm size may differ substan-
tially. However subsequent testing reveals [ha[ 'firm size' dces no[ cause problems in the presen[ study.
Furthermore, 'working time' is operalionalized by what seems a natural indicator oC [his variable: the
number of hours that the manager works per week.
Estimation by means of LISREL's Maximum Likelihood-procedure leads to the following results.
Positive, significant effects are measured both from 'bonus' on 'working time' and from 'working time' on
'bonus'. The measurement of the Cormer effec[ means tha[ even after tax and signalling effects and [he
sensi[ivity of the managcr's bonus Cor his effort are explicitly statistically controlled for, 1 s[ill find Ihat
managers are positively and significantly motivaled by their bonuses. So the empirical results corroborate
[he agency assumption tha[ managers are (indeed) motivated by their bonuses.
The measurement of the second effec[: of 'working time' on 'bonus', is also interesting in itself. It isconsistent wi[h the agency assumption that the manager's bonus is sensitive [o his effort, that is, that at
least part of [he manager's compensation is con[ingcnt upon informative mcasures of his effort. However
i[ is also consistent with [ax and signalling hypothcscs.~
In addition, 1 find [hat the magnitude of the work incentives from bonuses is small: on average Icss
than 2 of the 48 hours that these managers work per week (4 0l0 of thcir total working time) are induced
by their bonuses. This conclusion is similar to Jenscn and Murphy's 1990 conclusion about US CEOs:
that these managers are at mos[ weakly motivated by their pay. This similarity in conclusions about US
CEOs and about dutch functional managers suggests an interesting hypothesis [ha[ the weak work incen-
tives from pay packages is a general phenomenon, that consistently occurs across managerial ranks,
across firms and industries, and across cul[ures, such as Nor[h America and Europe. Future empirical
research will provide additional insight in this respect and is encouragcd.
Both the results of the Jensen and Murphy-study and of thc present sludy support [he intuition in
Baker et al. (1989) that observed wage contracts often induce wcak work incentives in order to keep
managcrs from focusing too narrowly on aspects of their performance to which the bonus is [ied. A
formal analysis of this issuc has recendy been devcloped in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990). Holmstrom
and Milgrom show in this paper that muled inccntivcs from honuses can bc optimal in settings where
agents have multiple tasks and some tasks are difficult to obscrve. Empirical results such as in Jensen
and Murphy (]990) and in the present study indicate that such new principal-agent theory is more
productive in explaining observed pay packagcs and bchaviour of managers than Iraditional single task
('effi~rt') principal-agent models lhat suggest sUong incentivcs from pay packagcs (HolmsUom, 1979,
Shavcll, 1979, ctc.).
Furthermure, I find that various modcl p;iramctcrs, including the significance of the inccnlive effecl
and various measures of thc modcl fil, arc impruvcd if it is cxplicitly mudcllcd thal managcrs arc risk
averse. This support Cor the risk aversity assumption adds to prcvious empirical results in Lambert and
Larckcr (1987) un this issue. Even more significant effects arc measured if, instead of the Maximum
Likcliho~id-procedure, LISREL's recendy devduped Wcightcd Lcast Squares-procedure is used that doesG
not require that observed variables are normally distributed. The latter procedure is used after it is
observed that the variable 'bonus' is highly skewed.
Finally, f also develop some theory about cross sectional variations in the size of the bonus of
functional managers. From Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, 1990) the hypothesis is derived tha[ mazke-
ting and sales managers earn higher bonuses than other functional managers, because principals obtain
more precise information about the actions of [he former managers than about other functional
managers: in [erms of the number of products sold during the last month or quar[er, in the form of
changes in the number of products sold during the last adverlisement campaign, and so on. A detailed
empirical analysis of the homogenous group of marketing managers, which controls (statistically) for
potentially confounding tax and signalling effects and differential labour market conditions for these
managers, provides weak support for [his 'precision of information'-hypothesis.
The development of theory about pay packages and behaviour of managers below [he rank of CEO
seems interesting in its own right. At present there is no well developed theory to explain the complex
pattern of compensation contracts and associated behaviour in firms (Baker et al., 1989). Some theory
exists on how compensation con[racts of CEOs are shaped (Murphy, 1985, Antle and Smith, 1986, Jensen
and Murphy, 1990) and how [hese con[racts vary across firms and indus[ries (Lambert and Larcker, 1987,
Lewcllen et al, 1987). Howevcr explana[ions of thc shape of compensation contracts of managers below
[he rank of CEO are virtually missing.8
This paper is structured as follows. The precision of information-hypothesis about variations in
bonuses across functional managers is developcd in section 2. This section also introduces elements of
thc Holmslrom and Milgrom framcwork, on which thc mcthodology of lhis papcr is hascd. This
methodology is presented in section 3. Section 4 contains a description of the data set and section 5
contains empirical results. The paper ends with some conclusions and suggestions for further research.7
2. Theury
In Ihis scction I derive hypu[hescs about cross sectiunal variations in the size of Ihc bunus of
functional managers. This theory complements existing theory on cross sectional variations in pay
packages wi[hin firms, such as Smi[h and Watts (1982) and Brickley and Dark (1987).
Consider [he following setting: a publicly owned firm with a board of direc[ors and mul[iple mana-
gers9 The board - as the principal - is assumed to maximize the value of contracts wi[h managers.to
Recent theory in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) implies tha[ the board offers a linear compensation
rule w(x) - Ax t b, where x is [he information signal about the manager's attention or time devoted to
work, and b the intercept which only serves to allocate thc tutal certainty equivalent between the two
parties. Ax can be in[erpreted as the manager's bonus and b as his salary. Holmstrom and Milgrom show
that the efficient A satisFies A- p ~(1 t rszC'), whcrc p is the cxpected gross profit from time devoted
[o work, s'' is the variance of the signal, r is the agcnt's absolute risk aversion and C is his personal cos[
function (cost of effort).
This theoretical result can be used to prcdict variations in lhe size of the bonus across func[ional
managers, given that more precise information secros available about the actions of e.g. marketing mana-
gers and sales managers than about other func[ional managers. This information about marketing and
sales managers consists of the number of products sold during thc last mon[h or quarter, [he increase in
the number of products sold during an advertisemcnt campaign, and so on. Furthermore, these observa-
blrs are easily compared with those of other marketing and salcs managers in lhe same industry. This
comparison is informative about common external factors, which Icads to even more precise informa[ion
ahuut Ihc individual aclions of lhcsc managcrs (ticc Larcar and Ruscn, 1981, Holmstrom, 1982, Anlle and
Smi[h, 1986). In con[ras[ less precise information seems availahte about other func[ional managers, such
as R~:cD-managers, since the ou[come of research activitics often becomes clear only (many) years later,
or abuut pcrsonnel managers, whose cffor[ to maint:cin and incrcasc the quality of the work furce is evcn
hard to measurc in a long term context.
Since the precision of the information about marketing and sales managers seems relatively high, the
variance of the information signal about their effort (s') is expected [o be relatively low. Hence, given [he8
above mentioned theoretical result in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), marketing and sales managers are
expected to be subjected to higher As which, in turn, are expected to lead to higher levels of effort and
to higher bonuses than in case of other functional managers.tl
The prediction [hat marke[ing and sales managers earn bigger bonuses than other functional
managers is in itself unsurprising. lt is well-known from the popular press that thcse managers sometimcs
earn large bonuses. However in this paper I submit and test one possible explanation of why these
managers earn bigger bonuses: because more precise information is available about their actions. This
explanation is non-trivial since other hypotheses, including tax and signalling hypotheses and hypotheses
about differen[ial labour market conditions, can also explain that these managers earn bigger bonuses.
This will be shown in the next section, that also describes [he methodology of this study.
3. Methodology
In this section it is modelled that 1) managers are motivated by their bonuses; and 2) marke[ing
and~or sales managers earn bigger bonuses than other functional managers because more precise
information is available about their actions. The model is specified such that hypothesized tax and
signalling effects and the hypothesized sensitivity of [he manager's bonus for his effor[ are explicitly con-
trolled for. Section 3.1 dcals with agency hypo[heses and section 3.2 with tax and signalling hypotheses.
3.1. Agency hypotheses.
1 start with thc hypolhesis that marketing and~or salcs managers earn higher bunuses becautie more
precise information is availablc about their ac[ions. This effect is modellcd in figure 1 as follows. In the
ligurc 'type of manager' is a dummy valucd 1 in case of a marketing manager and 0 olherwise, and
'hunus' is [hc managcrial bonus. (An analogous slory applics in casc of salcs managcrs.) So a positivc
effect is expected from 'type of manager' on 'bonus'.please insert [igure 1 here
Next I turn to the modelling of the hypothesircd agency effcct that agents are positively motivatcd by
their bonuses. This modelling requires some insight intu thc mcchanism of how bonuses motivale
managers. The theory of section 2 implies tha[ cet. par. a highcr A selected by [he principal at the begin-
ning of the period, induces the agen[ to select higher levels of attention and time devoted to work during
the period, resulting in a higher expected bonus Ax et the end of the period (both because A is higher
and because z is expected [o signal more effort).
So this theory implies that a higher A(highcr marginal revenucs for lhe agcnt from his effort) is
expectcd to lead to more time devoted to work. My data set docs not contain direct information about A,
so I cannot direc[ly measure Ihe effect of A on the amoun[ of working time. Therefore I opera[ionalize
A by lhe managcr's bonus, where higher bonuscs arc expec[cd to re(lect higher As. This leads to Ihe
specification of the positive effect of 'bonus' on 'wurking limc' in ligure 1.
fn view of thc structure of compensation contracts, the manager's bonus is expccted to be sensitive to
his efforL Hence also the revcrse effect of 'working timc' on 'bonus' should bc modelled in figure 1.
However after [he latter effect is explicidy statistically controlled for, [ still cxpect to measure a positive
effect of 'bunus' on 'working time', consistent with the agcncy assumption that agen[s are positively
motivated by their bonuses.
3.2. Tax and signalling hypcxheses.
Evcn if Ihc above hypothesized effccts arc mcasurcd, this rewlt can slill Ix; explained by othcr hypo-
Ihescs, such as tax and signalling hypothcses. This it shown in somc detail below, because tax and sig-
nalling hypotheses have drawn considerable attention in the literature, because they consistently pose
prohlems in empirical studies on compensatiun schcmes (scc Miller and Scholes, 1982, Warncr, 1985,10
Raviv, 1985), and because they also cause problcros in the context of the present study.
The reader may feel that some of thc identified potentially confounding tax and signalling influences
are somewhat 'theoretical' and are unGkely to occur in practice. If so, this s[rengthens one of [he main
empirical results of this paper: that absen[ confounding tax and signalling influences, i[ is found that
managers are positively motivated by their bonuses. Nevertheless, as I will show below, even in the
presen[ s[udy such tax and signalling influences cannot (completely) be excluded on theoretical grounds
alone. Hence there is reason to conduct an empirical test that explicitly controls for such effects.
My discussion star[s with tax hypo[heses. In their 1982 article Mi11er and Scholes seek 'to dis[inguish
schemes that seem intended mainly to share tax benefits from those, of greater interest to economists,
that appear designed as incen[ives to make the real pie bigger'. They show that bonus plans may in
reality be tax 'gimmicks', designed to reap tax bcne6ts.1z In essence these gimmicks allow the firm -
instead of the manager - to invest the manager's savings such that corporate taxes are paid over the life
of the investmcnt instcad of personal taxes. Miller and Scholes show that this s[rategy allows tax benefits
if corporate taxes are lower than personal taxes. This condition was satisfied in the Netherlands in 1984,
when the data that are analyzed in this paper were gathered. At that time, [he dutch corporate tax rate
was 0.43, while marginal personal [ax rates for managers typically were 0.67 or 0.72.
I[ is easily shown that [he Miller and Scholes tax story can also explain the exis[ence of a positive
correlation between 'working [ime' and 'bonus'. If managers increase [heir attention and working time,
this may increase their income. Hence they are able to save more, which may lead ro bigger salary
deferrals (called bonuses) in order to reap bigger tax benefi[s. So a tax story can explain that more
working time leads to biggcr bonuses. This theoretical effect is (also) cap[ured by the effect of 'working
time' on 'bonus' in figure 1. Fur[hermore, a tax story can explain that marketing managers earn bigger
bonuses than other func[ional managers. If labour market condi[ions allow marketing managers to nego-
tiate higher wages than other functional managcrs (and the data in the next section indicate that they
do), [hen marketing managers are able to save more and to reap more tax benefits through bigger bonu-
ses. This hypothe[ical tax effect is modelled in figure 1 as follows. The hypothesis that marketing mana-
gers are able to negotiate higher wages is modelled by the positive effect of 'type of manager' on 'to[altt
income'. The hypo[hesis lhat higher incomes lead [o highcr fwnuscs (through tax gimmicks) is modelled
by thc positive effect of 'total income' on 'bonus'.13
Als~~ a signalling story can explain a positivc correlatiun hetween 'bonus' and 'working time'. A
signalling story assumes that managers may possess good news that lhey wish to signal to the market.
One examplc of good news is tha[ managemcnl has committcd itsclf to a high level of effort, and one
crediblc way to signal this to the market is to acccpt a scheme that awards bonuses to managers based
on future firm performancc. So a signalling story can explain thal more working lime leads to bigger
bonuses. This hypolhetical effect is (also) capturcd by [he effec[ of 'working time' on 'bonus' in figure 1.
Fur[hermore, a signalling story can also explain thal marketing managers earn bigger bonuses than other
funclional managers. If marke[ing managers are ahle to ncgo[iatc highcr wages and if they are decreasin-
gly risk averse, a risky bonus imposes less disutilitv on marketing managcrs than on othcr managers.
Hence it is less costly to signal by means of marketing managers, which may explain their higher
bonuses. This effect is modelled in Figure 1 as follows. The hypothesis that marketing managers earn
higher wages is (also) captured by the positive effecl of 'type of manager' on 'total income'. The hypothe-
sis that higher incomes Icad to higher bonuses through chcaper signalling is (also) captured by the positi-
ve effect of 'total income' on 'bonus'.
Aftcr the above mentioned tax and signalling eflects are explicitly statistically controlled for, [ still
expect to mcasure: l) a positive effect of 'bonuti' on 'working timc', consislent with the agency assumpti-
on that agents are positivcly motivated by thcír bonuses;ta and 2) a positive direct effect of 'type of
manager' on 'bonus', consistent with the precision uf information-hypo[hcsis. This measurement is carried
out in the ncx[ scctions.
4. Data
Data were ob[ained from a survey among managcrs in the high-technology sector, held in [he
Netherlands in 1984 (Dijkstra, 1985).IS The data concern managers at the two highest management12
levels of their firm: general managers and functional managers directly below general management, such
as financial managers, marke[ing managers, and so on. The survey was carried out by means of
questionnaires, with a follow-up by telephone if questionnaires were no[ retumed in time. Eventually, 50
firms respondcd (20 "lo of lhc firms approachcd).~~' Mosl of [hcsc firms wcre subsidiarics of forcign
firms, mainly from the US. Thc mcdian age of thc firms in the data set was 19 years, the median number
of employees was 59, and the median sales were 17 million dutch guilders (roughly á 10 million). So
[hese firms are smaller than the firms tha[ are generally analyzed in the compensation literature.
Although 'high-techno(ogy' indica[es some homogeneity in indus[ries, it still entails electro-technical
firms, computer firms, chemical firms, engineering firms, and so on. Lewellen et. al. (1987) and Lambert
and Larcker (1987) have found variations in the shape of compensation eontracts across fvms and indus-
tries. Thereforc it scems appropria[e to analyle a more homogenous set of industries. In this paper I
only analyze managers employed at computer firms and electro-technical firms (n - 33). Table 1 lists all
162 managers employed at [he two highest management levels of these 33 firms, classified according to
their main function. This table also contains the mean and median bonuses and total compensation of
these managers.
pleasc insert table 1 herc
The following observa[ions can be made from [ablc 1:
' Table ] reveals that the observed bonuses are small relative to the bonuses documented in previous
empirical studies on compensation schemes. Mcan bonuses of general managers and of (unetional
managers amount to 17 0lo and ll oJo of [heir salary, respectively, while the CEOs of Ihe Jensen and
Murphy-study earn bonuses [hat amount to 50 0l0 of their salary. This difference is probably due to [he
fact that [hc firms in my data sct are smallcr than the firms in the Jensen and Murphy-study, and tha[ my
data set contains firms from Europe, where bonuses tend to be; much smaller than in the US. Further-13
morc, i[ is calculated from [he data set Ihat the mean number of hours of work per week is 47.931, or
almost 48 hours per week.t~
` Since Adam Smith, economis[s believe tha[ specialization of workers incrcases efficiency. Adam Smith
himself believed [hat the degree of specialization is unly limitcd by the size of the economy. In contrast,
modern economists rcalize that increased spcciali~ation is costly, which limits the extent of specialization.
This insight can be illustrated by the results of table 1. My data set contains all functional managers em-
ployed a[ 33 Pirms. Table 1 reveals that less than 25 oïo of these firms employ separate managers for
sales, purchases, personnel, [echnical services and education 8c training. Apparently in many instances it
is value maximizing to have one manager perform multiplc managemenl functions. Additiunal costs
associated with hiring separate managers for each managcmcnl function may be: higher average employ-
mcnt costs (duc tu non-[rivial fixcd costs of hirinf, managcrs, such as a company car, a company loan,
and so un), highcr intcrnal coordina[ion costs (brcausc managcrs arc only el wurk part-time) and cos[s
that arise if relevant information is spilled over to othcr 6rms, where managers are employed for the res[
of their time. Competitors could use such information strategically, which could severely hurt the 6rm's
in[erests.
' Murphy (1985) observes for Fortune top S00 firms that bonuses increase in managerial rank. The
results of table 1 suggest tha[ "Murphy's law" is quite generaL the same regularity is found in the present
study for much smaller, European firms.
` Table 1 reveals tha[, consistent with the precision of information-hypothesis, marketing managers (N -
2Ei) earn higher bonuses than other functional managcrs at the samc hierarchical level. However, as puin-
ted out earlier, this empirical resul[ does not neccssarily suppurt this hypothesis since tax and signalling
hyputhcses can alsu cxplain thcsc highcr bunuscti. Tahlc 1 also rcvcals that thc da[a scl cnnlains unly 7
salcs managcrs. Closer inspcction of [hc data rcvcals that thcsc managcrs arc primarily cmploycd al
largcr firms. Su it seems hard to generalize from this small subsct and the test of the hypothesis about
sales managers is left fur future analysis.t~ta
5. Empirical results.
This section contains empirical tests of the model of figure 1. Before the model is tested, several
steps are taken to mi[igate omitted variables-problems. Although empirical studies that e~camine cross
sectional data are inherently subject to potential omilted variable-problems absent a theory indicating all
rclcvant variables and data on these variablcs, it is nevertheless important to reduce such poten[ial
problems as much as possible. This is emphasized in the compensa[ion literature in Murphy (1985).
Given the importance of this issue, it is given more a[[en[ion in the present paper than is usually done in
empirical studies of compensation schemes that analyze cross sec[ional da[a.
This section is structured as follows. Potential omitted variables-problems are discussed in section
5.1. Section S.2 contains a[est of the model of figure 1. Section S.3 con[ains a test of an extension of the
model that also incorporates tha[ managers are risk averse. Finally, it is tested in section 5.4 whether the
estimation results are robust for dropping [he assump[ion that observed variables are normally
dis[ributed.
S.l. Potential omi[ted variables-problems.
Murphy (1985), Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Lewelten et aL (1987) have observed that
compensation packages vary across managerial rank, firms and industries. One way to mitigate associated
omitted variables-problems is [o analyze managers that are homogenous in rank and in industry. In the
previous section I already mentioned the selection of managers of firms of [he computer and electronics-
industry from thc morc hclcrogcnous high-tcchnology seclor. Sincc compcnsation contracts also vary
across managerial rank (see Murphy, 1985), thc homogeneity of the data set is further increased if only
functional managers directly below general management are analyzed. So general managers are lefi out
of the analysis.
This leaves potential omit[ed variables-problcros associated with firm size, since even within one
industry firm size may differ substantially. Omitted variables-problems associated with firm size occur if
thc sizc uf thc bonus corrclatcs wilh olhcr clcmcnls uf thc managcr's pay packagc, such as his insidc15
stockholdings, and both the bonus and inside stockholdings correlate with his working [ime. Jensen and
Murphy (1~~0), who also analyze managers of similar rank (CEOs), measure no significant relation be-
tween bonuses and inside stock holdings. Howc~~r I analyce managers of a differen[ rank: functional
managers, hence it cannot completely be excluded that firm siie causes omittcd variables-proMems in the
present study. Whether 'firm size' correlates with hoth 'bonus' and 'wurking time' is testcd below.
The data sct contains two variables that operationalize firm size: the number of employees in the
firm and the annual sales of the Grm. Both variables are available in the data set at the ordinal level,
ranging from 1 for the smalles[ ca[egory to 6 for the largest category. The variable 'working time' is
operationalized by the number of hours that the manager works per weck. The relevant correlation
coefficients are given in tablc 2.i9 Table 2 revcals insignificanl positive correlations betwcen bo[h
measures of Cirm size and 'bonus', and insignificant nega[ivc correlations bctwcen both measures of firm
size and 'hours of work'. So i[ seems Ihat 'firm sizc' is neithcr related to 'bonus' nor to 'hours of work',
and that it does not cause omit[ed variables-problcros in this study. Furthermore, the high positive corre-
lation between the number of employees in the firm and the annual sales of the firm (0.96) is an additio-
nal indica[ion that the da[a set is homogenous in Ihc technolugy of firms.
5.2. Estimation resul[s of the model oC figure 1.
The modcl of figure 1 is estimatcd on [he data set of 131 functional managers. ~ As mentioned
above, the [heoretical variable 'working time' is opcrationalized by what scems a natural indicator of this
variable: [he number of hours [hat the managcr works per weck. Thc manager's bonus is operationalized
as his total bonus dependent on pcrformance mcasurcd at the corporate, divisional or individual level.
His total income is salary t bonus t other elemen[s (fixed yearly gra[ifications, compensation for
ezpenses, and so on).
The model is es[imated by means of LISREL, a llexiblc framework for econometric analysis.
LISREL allows the simultaneous estimation of mulliplc equations, hence two-way relations can explicitly
be modelled (Joreskog, 1973, 1977, Joreskog and Wold, 1981).Zt The model of figure 1 is represented
in equa[ion (i) where yl - the manager's total income; y, - his bonus; y3 - hours of work; xt - type of16
manager, a dummy valued 1 in case of a marketing manager and 0 otherwise; b~~ - the effect of variable















Maximum Likelihood-estimates of [he model of equation (1) are presented in table 3.2z
please insert table 3 here
(1)
The following conclusions can be drawn from table 3. Both effec[s from 'bonus' on 'hours of work'
and from 'hours of work' on 'bonus' have the expected sign and are significant, assuming a one sided test
and a 0.05 significance level (t - 1.75 and t- 2.03, respectively). So I find that managers are positively
and significantly motivated by their bonuses, cven if lax and signalling effects and the sensi[ivity of the
manager's bonus for his effort are expiicitly controlled for. Furthermore, the significant posi[ive effect of
'hours of work' on 'bonus' is also interesting in itself. It is consistent with the agency assumption that the
manager's bonus is sensitive to his effort. However it is also consistent with tax and signalling hypotheses.
Furthermore, an eslimate can be made of [he magnitudc of the work incentives that the average
functional manager derives from his bonus. The model estimates of table 3, combined with the average
bonus of functional managers given in table 1, imply an average increase of (0.105)(9.554) - 1.003 hours,
that is, roughly one hour of work per week. So the average functional manager appears to derive positive
but weak work incen[ives from his bonus.
Table 3 also reveals that marketing managers earn significantly higher total incomes than other
managers at the same management level (t - 4.69). These higher incomes lead to significantly higher17
bonuses (t - 6.95). The last result is consistent with a tax hypothesis, or a signalling hypothesis, ur
both.23 However I find [hat after these other non-mutually exclusive effec[s are statistically controlled
for, marketing managers still earn significantly higher bonuses than other managers (t -].69). This is
consistent with the precision of information-hypothesis.
5.3. The bonus as a por[ion of total income.
The model estima[ed in sec[ion 5.2 is incorrec[ if the managcr's work incentives (that is, [he effect
from 'bonus' on 'hours of work') depend no[ so much on the absolute size of the bonus bu[ on its
relative size: the portion of total income Ihat is at stake. So a bonus of, say, f 10.000 may provide s[ron-
ger work incentives for a manager earning f f30,(xxl.- lhan for a manager earning f 400,000.- This would
be cunsistent with risk aversity: a common assumption of agency theory. This assumption is tested in [he
following way. I reestimated the model of figure 1 with, in stcad of the variable 'bonus' the variable
'fraction', defined as the bonus ~ total income. The estimation resu(ts are presented in [able 4.
plcase insert tahle 4 here
Table 4 revcals that the effect of 'fraction' un 'hours of wurk' is more significant [han thc earlier
mcasured effect from 'bonus' on 'hours of work' (t - 1';M) xgainst t- 1.75 carlier). Also, the to[al work
incentives from bonuses, calculated from [able 3 and thr avcrage fractiun of func[ional managers as
22.3ft2 (0.(kS')) - Lc~II hours per week, are almost twice as hig as in case of absolute bonuses. Finally, I
find that lhe explained portion of the variance of the numh~r of hours tha[ the manager works per week
increases from 0.16 to 0.24. All [hese results suggest that the portion of the manager's income that is a[
stakc, rather than his bonus per se, affects his effort. So these estimation results support the risk aversity
assumption (see also Lambert and Larcker, 1987).
Th~. effect of 'type of manager' on 'fraction' is significant at lhc 0.05 Icvcl, assuming a one sided lest18
(t - 1.65). The result that marketing managers earn higher fractions of the'v [otal income in the form of
bonuses is, stricUy spcaking, a stronger result than the earlier found result that marketing managers earn
higher bonuses, in view of the higher total wages of markcting managers. However the effect is only
harely significant.
5.4. Observed variables are not normally distributed.
Classical theory of covariance structures (Browne, 1974, Joreskog, 1981) holds in particular if the
observed variables have a multivaria[e normal distribution. The Mabmum likelihood-method used above
is also based on this theory. However, the results of table 1 suggest that the variable bonus is abnormally
distributed since the median bonus of functional managers is much smaller than the mean bonus: f 3,100
and f 9,SS4 respectively. Addi[ional calculations reveal that [he skewness and [he kurtosis of the observed
bonuses are 3.615 and 16.321, respectively. Both measures are significant at the 0.001 level. Hence the
hypothesis that [he variable bonus is normally distributed is rcjecled. As a result previous estimates, e.g.
of standard deviations and of chi-squares, may be biased.
The rest of this section contains a tes[ of whether the estimation results of sections S.2 and S.3 are
robust against dropping the assumption that observables are normally distributed. In Browne (1984) the
theory for covariance structures is generalized to any multivariate distribution, resulting in the Weighted
Least Squares method (WLS). This method is part of the most recently developed LISREL-framework:
LISREL-VII. WLS-estimates of the model of figure 1 are presented in table S. WLS-estimates of the
model of figure 1 with 'bonus' replaced by 'fraction' are presented in table 6.
please insert table S here1')
pl~asc insert tablc fi here
The following conclusions can be drawn if thc WLS-estimates of tables 5 and 6 are compared to thc
ML-estimates of tables 3 and 4.24 The effec[s of 'type of manager' on 'bonus' and on 'fraction' s[ill
have the expected sign but become insignificant (t - 1.34 and [- 1.16, respec[ively). Both interrelations
be[ween 'bonus' and 'hours of work' are more significant than in case of ML. In sum: the empirical sup-
por[ weakens for [he precision of informa[ion-hypothesis, but streng[hens for the assumption tha[ mana-
gers are mo[iva[ed by [hcir bonuses.
6. Conclusions and sut;gestions for further research
This paper presents evidence from a 19R4 data sct of 131 funclional managers of the computer and
elec[ronics-industry in the Netherlands. I find that these managers arc positivcly and significantly mo[iva-
ted by their bonuses, even after potentially confounding tax and signalling effects and the sensitivity of
the manager's bonus for his effort are explicitly statistically controlled for. However I also find that the
magnitude of work incentives from bonuses is smalL the average functional manager is induced to less
than tw~~ additional hours of work per week by his bonus.
Thc conclusion [hat managers derive wcak inccnlives from their bonuses is similar to the conclusion
[hat .fcnsen and Murphy (1990) dcrive from lheir data set of US CEOs. This suggests [hat weak work
inccnlivrt frum compensation packages is a gencral phenomcnon, thal can consistently be found across
differcnt managerial rank, firms and industrics, and different cultures, such as North America and
Europc. Such wcak inccnlivcs from compcnsali~m p:~ckagcs m:ry contrast with the much strongcr
inccnti~cs that arisc if managcrs are also majur rctiidual risk Ixnarcrs, such as in in[repreneurial firms, in
s.
case of franchising, after anagement buy-outs, and so on. Future empirical research might lead to inte-
resting insights in this respect and is therefore enaiuraged.20
The above suggested more modest view on the economic relevance of pecuniary incentives (the
'sadder bu[ wiser'-view) is consisten[ with recent comments on agency theory by Herber[ A. Simon in a
recent interview on current trends in Accounting: 'The problem I have with .. agency theory .. is that this
theory seems to look almost entirely at economic inducements. This theory also seems to assume that
leisure is such a desirable good that people are intrinsically shirkers and that they will only do what can
be enforccd. There is a tremcndous amount of psychological evidence that contradicts this: human beings
arc not only cap.~hlc of acyuiring strong loyaltics lo organizatiom or organi~ational units, thcy arc
incapable of no[ acquiring them. .. People do all sor[s of things for which they receive no reward. They
don't just do the minimum they can do wi[hout get[ing caught.' (see the July 1990 issue of the Ac-
counting Review, p. 658-667).~
Simon's point seems to be that utility functions of managers are differendy shaped than is generally
assumed in principal-agent theory: managers may highly value loyalty, perhaps also power and s[atus,
they may value their work ('effort') positively up to some level, and so on. As a result managers may
select positive and even high levels of effort even if they earn fixed salaries, provided that they earn their
rescrvation wage. This may provide a second explanation of why the optimal pay package induces weak
work incentives, in addi[ion to the earlier explanation that managers have multiple tasks and some tasks
are dif6cult to observe. Interesting in this respcc[ is that Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) explicitly allow
that managers derive positive utility from time devoted to work up to some level.
Finally, I also derived and tested hypo[heses about cross sectional variations in the size of the bonus
of functional managers. The hypothesis was derived that marketing and sales managers earn higher
bonuses than other func[ional managers, because more precise information is available about their
actions. An empirical analysis of marketing managers, that explicidy controlled for tax and signalling
effects and differential labour market conditions, provided weak support for this 'precision of informati-
on'-hypothesis.
At present Gttle knowledge exists in the compensation literature on how the compensation contracts
of managers below the rank of CEO are shaped and what behaviour is induced by [hese contracts. It
secros nevertheless important to develop such theory. Modern corporations often employ thousands andzi
sometimes hundreds of thousands of workers. Thc notion that thc CEO controls all or most impor[ant
decisions in the firm is consistent with an holis[ic point of vicw but not wi[h the agency perspec[ive of [he
firm as a nexus of contracts, where decision managcment and decision control are spread over multiple
hierarchical layers in order to reduce information costs (Fama and Jcnsen, 1y83). Additional insight into
how thc compensation contracts of managers bclow thc rank of CEO are shaped may eventually lead to
improved explanations of important decisions in thc firm: lhc sclcction of investment projects, the
adoption and use of accoun[ing rules, Ihe firm's mcrger and acquisition strategy, and so on.z?
F'ootnotes
l. For an overvicw, see Hart and Holmstrom (1987), and their more than 130 re(erences.
2. A more cynical but perhaps more realistic view is [hat while i[s illegal for managers [o trade on their
inside informa[ion in the stock market, it is not illegal for them to adopt compensation policies that take
advan[age of unrevealed informa[ion. Managers with good news about next year's accoun[ing re[urns
might, for example, push [hrough a short-run bonus plan which allows [hem [o benefit from next year's
performance. The market, observing the proposed bonus plan, will infer that managers think next year
will be good.
3. Principal agent theorists have also argued that: 1) 'anecdotal evidencé supports that managers are
motívated by their bonuses. However if anecdotes circulate in favor of an hypo[hesis, it is usually not
difficult [o find anecdotes against it 2) laboratory experiments have shown [ha[ individuals, usually stu-
dents, rcact positively to pecuniary stimuli. However it is no[ obvious that results that apply to cash-
hungry students in laboratory se[tings also apply to managers in real life settings. Or as Burton and Obel,
who conducted one of the more realistic experiments in this field, have pu[ it: '(I)aboratory experiments
have limited realism and external validity.' (Burton and Obel, 1988).
4. Obviously, time spend at work is itself not necessarily productive. However in the Holmstrom and
Milgrom framcwork, rational managcrs subjccted to compcnsation plans that reward productive work
have, for the relevant domain of dccisions, no incentive to spend additional time at work if this time is
nnt madc productivc. Tu givc an example: a manager working at friday night, who is only rewarded for
productive work, has no incentive to spend an additional hour at work improductively if he can also
spend this time with his family at home or with his friends on the golf links. Alterna[ively, if the manager
is still able to be productive and if bonuses reward productive work, then the manager may decide to
spend some additional time working.
5. Most of these firms are subsidiaries of foreign firms, mainly from the US.
6. Tha[ pay packages vary across managerial rank, firms and industries, is documen[ed in Murphy23
(1985), Lamberl aad Larcker (1987), and Le~wellen et aL (1987).
7. That the measured pay for effort sensitivity can also be cxplained by tax and sígnalling hypotheses is
not a uniyuc aspcct of Ihis study. Thc posilive pay pcrfurmancr ticnsitivity documcnlcd in Jcnscn and
Murphy (lc)`~) can also be explained by tax and signalling cffects, although Jensen and Murphy do not
mention such alternative explanations. Incidentally, thesc putentially confounding effects strengthen rather
than wcaken their conclusion that Ihe CEOs in thcir data set are not 'significantly' motivated by their
pay.
8. Exceptions are Smi[h and Watts (1982), Murphy (1985) and Brickley and Dark (1987).
9. A hoard may exist if the gains from monitoring managerial effort (Holmstrom, 1979, Shavell, 1979)
and from screening projects initiated by managers (sec Sah and Stiglit-r., 1985, 1986) are largcr than the
cos[ of installing and maintaining [he board. Apparently these gains often surpass the costs, in view of [he
board's survival in public corporations (Fama and .Icnscn, 1983).
10. So problcros duc to 'what if thc principal is nol thc principal' are assumcd away (Baker et al., 1989).
Board members may be mo[iva[ed because lhey own shares of thc firm, because of proxy fights or takco-
ver threats (possibly resul[ing in a removal of incumbcn[ direclurs) or because their performance as a
director affects their reputa[ion and hence [hcir income in o[her occupations: as a director or as a
manager at another firm (Mannc, 1965, Fama, 1981), Fama and Jensen, 1983, Jensen and Ruback, 1983,
Jensen and Warner, 1988).
11. Thc result that markcting and sales managcrs carn highcr bonuses than other Cunctional managers
can also bc derived from more traditional agcncy Ihcury. Lambcrt and Larcker (1987) show [hat if in
additiun to the se[ting assumed in Holmstrom (197c)) it is assumed [hat the agent's utility function for
moncy U(c) -(l~(1-k)).ct-~ and, following Bankcr and Datar (1987), [hat the probability distributions
are uf thc class of exponcntial, normal or binomial distributinns (among others), il follows thaC
Ic(~Yl]" - I} m(do t g{dx[x - E(xIa)} } dylY - E(yIa)~}),
where x- the agent's output, y- other information about his cffort, k- a constant, l,m are Lagrangc24
multipliers, dx - s(x ~ a)war(z ~a), and dY - s(y ~ a)war(y ~ a). Hcnce c(x,y): the agent's compensation is
increasing in dx and dy: the signal-to-noise ratios of the information signals of the agen['s performance.
Given higher signal-to-noise ratios for marketing and sales managers, these managers are expected to
earn higher compensation or higher bonuses.
12. Miller and Scholes obtain similar conclusion for other 'incen[ive' schemes, including various types of
stock (res[ricted stock, phantom stock, performance shares) and options (option stock, appreciation
righ[s, stock purchase plans).
13. A positive effect could also be modelled of 'bonuses' on '[o[al income' because total income - salary
} bonus f other elements. I will come back [o this later.
14. Even if direct information about A would have been available and the effect of 'A' on 'working time'
could have been modelled instead of Ihe effect of 'bonus' on 'working time', still the reverse effect of
'hours of work' on A should have becn modellcd in order to con[rol for [ax and signalling effecls. So
even if direct information about A is available, there is still reason to specify and estimate a non-
recursive model.
15. High-technology Firms were defined in terms of RBiD-expenditures (above industry average), OESO-
specialilation coefficients, and so on. Only firms with more than 10 employees were selected (Dijkstra,
1985).
1G. Since the non-response ratc was quite high (80 010), tests were carried out to check for response bias,
e.g. a chi-square test was carried out on the types of industries that responded: electro-technical firms,
computer firms, chemical firms, engineering firms, and so on. No significant scores were found.
17. The number of hours per week is obtained from self-reporting of managers. Since this information is
given in [he context of anonymous questionnaires, managers have no incentive [o signal false information
about their cffor[.
18. If anything, though, the bonuses of sales managers of table 1 do not suggest that the precision ofavailable information is a factor that dominates all other factors that affect the size of the bonus.
19. In case onc variable was measured on at Ira,t interval Icvel (such as the bonus) and thc ulher
variable on the ordinal Icvcl (such as the number uf cmployces) thc table gives the polyscrial currclation
because this correlation exploits the interval propcrtics of the first variable. Alternatively, a rank order
corrclation could havc bccn calcula[cd. Huwcvcr in that casc information would have bc;cn 'thrown away'
hecause bo[h variables are treated as ordinal, and an insigniticant correlation could have been mcasured
even if 'in reality' [hc correlation is significant.
20. An ahernative way to check for omi[tcd variablcs-problems is to include variables that may cause
problems, such as 6rm size, in Ihe empirical model. However since lhe variables that operationalize firm
size are measured at the ordinal Ievel, an empirical mudcl could only have bcen estimated from a
correlation matrix ([ha[ includes polyserial correlations) and nol from a covariance matrix. Such
estimates from a correlation matrix would have been infurmative about the economctric significance of
effects but not on the magnitude of effects, [hat is, on thcir economic signiticance. However in [his paper
1 am also inlerested in the economic significance of cffccts.
21. For an introduc[ion to LISREL, sec Barkcma and Folmcr (1983).
22. The covariance malrix of [hc random disturbances in lhe struclural cyualions is assumed lo be
diagonal. The modcl could also have been estimaled by e.g. 2SLS. Since these estimates are virtually
identical, they are omitted here.
23. It is easy, though, to imagine other hypotheses that can also explain the positive relation between
'total income' and 'bonus', such as that it is less cnstly to inducc risky bonuses on managers with higher
incomes. Furthermore, an addi[ional effect of 'bonus' on 'total income' could be modelled since, by defi-
nition, total income - salary f bonus f o[her elemcnts. This model was also estimated but since the
estimation results do not affect above conclusion.ti in any way, they are omitted here.
24. Thcse etitimalcs havc to be inlerprcled wi[h some carc bccause lhc small sample propcrties of WL.S
arc wmcwhat uncxplorcd ycL Although N- 131 iti ncH rc,cllv a tinr.cll samplc, somc carc is in ordcr.~
25. Interestingly, the latter claim is consistent with the result in the presen[ study that even in the
absence of bonuses, managers work on averagc 46 hours per week. However this result can also be
explained as a result of other incentive mechanisms such as inside stock ownership and discip6ne from
labour markets.Figure 1.
A theoretical model that explicitly separa[es hypo[hesized agency effects from hypothesized tax
and signalling effec[s. 'Type of manager' is a dummy valued 1 in case of a marketing manager













Bonuses, salaries and total income of managers (N - 162) of the two highest management levels
of a 1984 sample of 33 dutch firms from the computer and electronics-industry. Managers are
classified according to their main management function. The bonus is the manager's total bonus
dependent on performance at the corporate, divisional or personal level, total income - salary t
bonus t other income. Bonuses, salaries and total income are in dutcó guilders.
bonus salary total income
mean median mean median mean median











9,554 3,]00 86,469 83,000 106,938 104,000
5,441 0,000 82,290 78,000 98,409 102,300
8,482 3,300 82,953 81,000 102,382 100,000
21,917 G,990 103,S15 98,11OD 138,688 128,000
8,514 6,000 91,429 83,000 110,857 107,000
4,431 3,820 72,157 67,100 83,500 77,500
3,222 0,000 88,444 75,000 103,222 82,000
4,488 ],000 83,143 94,000 102,1R7 113,000
7,119 0,000 87,654 83,000 102,G(i2 88,0()n













Education cYz training 10,000 1Q,0O0 48,500 48,500 67,500 67,500 2Tablc 2.
Correlation coefficients from a 1984 samplc ol 131 functional managcrs uf lhc compulcr and
electronics-industry in the Netherlands. The variablc 'hours' is the number of hours that a
manager works per weck, 'bonus' is the manager's bonus dependent on performance al the
corpurate, divisional or individual level, 'employces' is [he number of employces of thc firm
where the manager is employed, 'sales' is the annual sales of the firro where the manager is
employed.




employees -0.035 0.092 1.0()D
(0.689) (0.298)
salcs -0.053 0.125 0.957 1.000
(0.550) (0.156) (0.000)
Note - Prob. values of the hypothesis that the corresponding correlation coefficient is 0 are given
in parentheses. The variables 'employees' and 'sales' arc available in the data set at the ordinal
levcl. A Pearson corrdation coefficient was calculated if both variables were at least on an
interval level, polyserial correlations were calculated if one variable was at least on an interval
level and the other variable was at the ordinal level, and a polychoric correlation was calculated if
both variables wcrc at the ordinal Icvel.Table 3.
LISREL Maximum likelihood-estimates from a 1984 sample of 131 managers of the computer
and electronics-industry in the Netherlands. 'Type of manager' is a dummy, valued 1 in case of a
marketing manager and 0 otherwise; bonus is the total bonus dependent on performance at the
corporate, divisional and individual level; 'total income' - salary t bonus f other elemen[s;














RZ 0.146 0.456 0.155
~) tolal income and bonuses are in thousands of dutch guilders. RZ is Ihe squared multiple
corrclation for lhc structural cyualions. Thc chi-syuarc for lhc wholc model wilh 1 dcgrcc uf
freedom - 0.71 (p - 0.40). The Goodness of Fit Index (0 ~(iFI ~ 1) for the model is 0.997.Tablc 4.
LISREL Maximum likelihood-estimates from a 1984 sample of 131 managers of the computer
and electronics-industry in the Netherlands. 'Type of manager' is a dummy, valued 1 in case of a
marke[ing manager and 0 otherwise; 'fraction' is the total bonus depcndent on performance at
the corporate, divisional and individual Ievcl divided by 'total income'; 'total income' is salary f















R~ 0.14fi 0.41 I 0.242
~) total income is in thousands of dulch guildcrs. R` is the squared multiple correlation for the
structural cquations. The chi-square for thc whole modcl with 1 degrec of freedom - O.S6 (p -
0.45). The Goodness of Fit Index (0 5 GFI ~ I) for thc model is 0.998.Tablc 5.
LISREL Weighted Least Squares-estimates from a 1984 sample of 131 managers of the computer
and electronics-industry in the Netherlands. 'Type of manager' is a dummy, valued 1 in case of a
marketing manager and 0 otherwise; bonus is the total bonus dependent on performance at the
corporate, divisional and individual level; 'total income' - salary f bonus t other elements;








bonus~ - - 0.103
(2.29)
total income~ bonus~ hours of work
hours - 0.521
of work (2.26)
Rz O.153 0.456 0.157
~) total income and bonuses are in thousands of dutch guilders. RZ is the squared multiple
correlation for the structural equations. The chi-square for the whole model wi[6 1 degree of
freedom - 0.51 (p - 0.4f3). The Goodness of Fit Index (0 5 GFI 5 1) for the model is 0.997.Tahlc h.
LISREL Weighted Least Squares-cstimates from a I~Iftd samplc of 131 managers from lhe
computer and electronics-industry in lhe Ne[herlands. 'Type of manager' is a dummy, valucd 1 in
case of a marketing manager and 0 o[herwise; 'fraction' is the total bonus dependent on perfor-
mance at the corporate, divisional and individual Ievel, dividcd by 'total income'; '[otal income' -









fraction - - 21.65
(2.34)
total income~ fractiun hours of work
hours - 0.(N)3H78
of work (2.03)
R' ' 0.151 11.407 0.235
') total income is in thuusands of dutch guiWcrs. R' ' iti thc syuared mul[iple correlation for the
structural equations. Thc chi-square for the whulc modcl with 1 degree of freedom - 0.43 (p -
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